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Hessam Mahdavifar, Ahmad Beirami, Behrouz Touri, and Jeff S. Shamma
Abstract— Global games form a subclass of games with incom-
plete information where a set of agents decide actions against a
regime with an underlying fundamental θ representing its power.
Each agent has access to an independent noisy observation of θ.
In order to capture the behavior of agents in a social network of
information exchange we assume that agents share their observa-
tion in a noisy environment prior to making their decision. We
show that global games with noisy sharing of information do not
admit an intuitive type of threshold policy which only depends on
agents’ belief about the underlying θ. This is in contrast to the
existing results on the threshold policy for the conventional set-
up of global games. Motivated by this result, we investigate the
existence of equilibrium strategies in a more general collection of
threshold-type policies and show that such equilibrium strategies
exist and are unique if the sharing of information happens over a
sufficiently noisy environment.
Index Terms— Global game, threshold policy
I. INTRODUCTION
Games of incomplete information are central to modeling of
socio-economic behaviors in social networks. In games with
incomplete information, the information that is shared among
the agents is not symmetric and often each agent has access to
limited information about the game’s parameters, which may
be correlated with the information that is available to the other
agents. This incompleteness of information is often represented
by considering the payoff as a function of some random variable
whose exact value is not known to the agents, which is called
the underlying economic or political fundamental in the society.
A subclass of games with incomplete information is the class
of global games, originally introduced in [1], [2]. In its simplest
form, each agent has access to an independent observation of
the underlying fundamental based on which she takes either of
the two actions: risky or safe action. The payoff of an agent
taking the risky action is monotonically increasing with the
number of agents who take the risky action and is a decreasing
function of the underlying fundamental.
Global games have been central to modeling and study-
ing many social coordination phenomena. In [1], the authors
discussed a general form of global games for two players
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and discussed how the vanishing noise in a public informa-
tion results in a unique threshold policy. Such analysis and
modeling technique was extended and used in [3] to model
currency attacks. The authors model currency attack using a
global game formulation and the authors show that even though
the complete information variation of the game has multiple
(Nash) equilibria, introducing a small noise into speculators
observations about the economic fundamental leads to a unique
threshold policy equilibrium. In [4], a similar idea is used to
model the debt crisis and to arrive at a unique threshold policy
for the players given the noisy observations of the players.
Finally, in [5], the accuracy of the prediction of the global
games results have been extensively studied and the authors
concluded that: “Comparing sessions with common and private
information, we observe only small differences in behavior.”
In the engineering domain, the authors of [6] have discussed
the application of global games in distributed task-allocation
in collaborative robotic networks and utilized the same idea to
show the uniqueness of threshold policies for task allocation in
coordination problems in robotics networks.
The majority of the past studies on global games have been
focused on the information structure where each agent has an
independent noisy observation of the underlying economic or
social fundamental, i.e., given the fundamental, the observa-
tions of each agent is independent of the rest of the agents’
observations. In such settings, it has been shown that, under
some condition on the distribution of the underlying fundamen-
tal and the independency of agents’ observations, there exists
an equilibrium strategy with threshold policies based on the
private observations of each agent. In [7], the case of perfect
sharing of information was introduced and the structure of
equilibria for global games with perfect sharing of information
was discussed. We challenge robustness of these results to
sharing of information: we show that even in a simple instance
of global games, when agents share information, the intuitive
equilibrium doesn’t exist. However, we show that with a proper
generalization of the notion of threshold policy, a symmetric
threshold policy (in its extended sense), exists under some
conditions on the communication noise. This paper extends the
results of the authors in [8], [9] and provides an extension of the
existence of a symmetric equilibria in global games with noisy
sharing of information involving more than two players.
In this paper, global games with noisy sharing of information
are introduced where any two agents share their information in
a noisy environment. Our contributions are summarized below:
• We show the fragility of the existing results in global
games by showing that with noisy sharing of informa-
tion, an intuitive threshold policy which only depends on
agents’ belief about the underlying fundamental does not
lead to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
• We show that if a certain functional equation has a solu-
tion, then a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists
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for global games with noisy sharing of information which
can be described as a generalized form of the intuitive
threshold policies.
• We utilize Banach fixed point theorem and show that
the functional equation has a solution if the noise and
the information structure of the underlying model satisfy
certain conditions. This establishes the existence of the
generalized threshold strategy equilibria, when the noise
parameters and the information structure satisfy certain
conditions.
It is worth noting that this work also relates to many of the
recent attempts for understanding the role of information and
information structure in multiagent decision making problems
[10]–[13]. In this paper, we consider a static framework, similar
to most applications of global games. Global games have been
also studied with delay [14] and in dynamic framework [15],
which also relates to networking games and evolution of coop-
eration in social networks [16]–[20]. The structure of this paper
is as follows. In Section II we introduce global games with
noisy sharing of information, and we mathematically formulate
the problem of interest. In Section III we state the three main
theorems of the paper on the non-existence of certain intuitive
threshold policies, the existence of a general form of threshold
policies, and the convergence to this threshold policy via an
iterative method. In Section IV the proofs of the three main the-
orems are established. Some numerical examples are provided
in Section V. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
In this section, we present the framework of the problem that
will be studied in this paper. We study the basic form of the
global games with noisy sharing of information. In this setting,
we consider a set
[n] := {1, . . . , n},
of n agents or players. Each agent has a set of binary actions
Ai = {0, 1}. We refer to the action αi = 1 as the risky action
and αi = 0 as the safe action. The payoff of an agent taking
the safe action is zero, whereas that of taking the risky action
is
∑n
i=1 αi − θ, where θ is a random variable representing the
underlying fundamental in the society. In other words, if α =
(α1, . . . , αn) ∈ {0, 1}n is an action profile of the n agents, then
the utility of the ith agent is the function ui with
ui(α) = αi
 n∑
j=1
αj − θ
 . (1)
Remark. For an intuitive description of the utility functions
consider global games in the context of political regime change
[21]. In this set-up, the parameter θ represents the power of
a political regime that can be overthrown but only if enough
citizens participate in an uprising, i.e., take the risky action.
It is thus natural to assume that the utility function of agents
taking the risky action is increasing in the number of such
agents and is decreasing in the fundamental parameter θ. Also,
the utility function of agents taking the safe action is considered
to be zero. Therefore, utility functions of the form given in (1)
are natural to use in global game models. The results in the
global games literature can often be extended to general utility
functions that are monotone in the number of agents taking the
risky actions as well as θ.
Observations and Policies: In the standard setting for global
games, agent i is observing xi = θ + ηi where ηi’s are iden-
tically and independently distributed random variables [1], [2].
In our work, agents share their observations xi with the other
agents in the society through noisy channels. In other words,
each agent has its private observation xi as well as noisy obser-
vations of other agents’ private observations. Mathematically,
we represent agent i’s overall observation by a random vector
yi ∈ Rqi (which relates to θ and other agents’ observations).
The parameter qi represents the number of observations that
agent i has. In this paper, we focus on the case that each agent
shares its observation with all other agents. Hence, qi = n, for
all i ∈ [n]. We refer to yi as the (private) information of agent i
(about θ). We refer to a measurable function si : Rqi → Ai that
maps a private observation of agent i to one of the two actions as
a (pure) strategy or policy. When qi = 1 for some i, we say that
si is a threshold policy if si(y) = 1 for y 6 t and si(y) = 0 for
y > t, for some threshold value t. We denote such a strategy by
si(y) = 1y6t. In almost all the instances of the global games,
the random variables have continuous joint distribution, and
hence, the value of the strategy si at the threshold value t is
practically unimportant.
Equilibrium: Our focus in this paper is on the existence
of a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) that results in a
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. To introduce this concept, let
s = (s1, . . . , sn) be a strategy profile of the n agents and let
s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn) be the strategy profile of
the n − 1 agents except the ith agent’s strategy. We say that a
best response strategy to the strategy profile s−i is a strategy
s˜ : Rqi → Ai such that
s˜(u) =
{
0 if 1 + E[
∑
j 6=i sj(yj) | yi = u] < E[θ | yi = u],
1 if 1 + E[
∑
j 6=i sj(yj) | yi = u] > E[θ | yi = u].
(2)
We denote the set of all best responses to a strategy profile
s−i by BRi(s−i). Finally, we say that a strategy profile s =
(s1, . . . , sn) is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium or simply an
equilibrium if si ∈ BR(s−i) for all i ∈ [n].
An extensively studied model in global games is the case
where qi = 1 for all i ∈ [n] and yi = xi = θ + ξi
where {ξ1, . . . , ξn} are independent and identically distributed
N (0, σ2) Gaussian random variables for some σ2 > 0. Fur-
thermore, it is customary to assume that θ is picked from a
non-informative uniform distribution over R. See [22] and the
references therein for further discussion on this assumption.
In [22], it is shown that there exists a symmetric threshold
policy on xi’s which corresponds to a Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium for this instance of global games. In other words, there
exists a threshold value t ∈ R such that for xi 6 t, agent i
chooses to take the risky action and for xi > t, she takes the
safe action and such an action profile leads to an equilibrium.
Here, an important fact is that xi = E[θ | xi] which means that
in such an equilibrium each agent should compare her expected
strength of regime given her private observation to a threshold
and take a proper action accordingly.
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Figure 1. The dependence diagram between the observation vector yi =
(xi, {yji}j∈[n]\{i}) of agent i. In this diagram, χ σ
2
−−→ ψ implies that
ψ = χ+ ω, where χ and ω are independent and ω ∼ N (0, σ2).
Our Model for Information Structure: In this work, we
consider global games with noisy sharing of information. We
seek to understand the role of information sharing among the
agents in the decision making scenarios that are modeled by
global games.
Throughout this work the utility of each agent is given
by (1) and the information structure satisfies the following
assumption.
Assumption 1 We assume that θ is uniformly distributed over
R. Also, agent i’s private information is the n dimensional
random vector:
yi := (xi, {yji}j∈[n]\{i}), (3)
where xi = θ + ξi for all i ∈ [n] and yji = xj + ζji for j 6= i,
where ξ1, . . . , ξn are i.i.d. N (0, σ2) random variables and ζji
are i.i.d. N (0, τ2) random variables that are independent of
ξ1, . . . , ξn, and σ2, τ2 > 0 are given parameters.
The dependence diagram of the random observation vector
yi = (xi, {yji}j∈[n]\{i}) that is available to agent i is shown in
Figure 1.
Throughout the rest of the paper, the scalar
∑
j∈[n]\{i} yji
which is the sum of all the information arrived at agent i from
the rest of agents plays a central role. We denote this quantity
by zi, i.e.,
zi :=
∑
j∈[n]\{i}
yji. (4)
We define a global game with noisy sharing of information
as below.
Definition1 A game with utility functions u1, . . . , un de-
scribed by (1) and information structure satisfying Assump-
tion 1 is a global game with noisy information sharing.
The major challenge in analyzing global games with noisy
information sharing is the limited information of each agent
about the underlying fundamental θ. Note that if all the agents
know about the exact realization of θ, and for θ 6= n either of the
symmetric actions (0, . . . , 0) or (1, . . . , 1) would be appealing.
However, in the global games, the perfect knowledge of the
underlying fundamental is not available to any agent and each
agent has a noisy observation of the fundamental θ.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present the main results of this work
including two results. The first result establishes nonexistence
of an intuitive equilibrium for global games with noisy sharing
of information. The second result shows that under a certain
regime, there exists a threshold policy based on each agent’s
private information and the (noisy) information that is shared
with her by the other agents.
A. Nonexistence of an Intuitive Equilibrium
In many instances of global games, one can show that there
exists a threshold policy based on the expected value of the
underlying fundamental given each agent’s information. More
precisely, let
θ¯i(yi) = E[θ | yi].
It has been shown that if there is no sharing of information
(i.e., yi = xi) and θ is uniformly distributed over R or θ has
a Gaussian prior, then there exists a threshold value t such
that the policy (1θ¯1(y1)6t, . . . , 1θ¯n(yn)6t) is a Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium for the global games described above [23].
In the case of global games with noisy sharing of informa-
tion, one may hope to have a similar result, i.e., there exists a
threshold value t such that if everyone compares her expected
value of the fundamental variable θ given her own information,
the policy (1θ¯1(y1)6t, . . . , 1θ¯n(yn)6t) would be a Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium. For example, in the case of a bank run, one may
speculate that if each agent compares her expected strength
of the economy given her own information, she should decide
whether to take her money out of the bank or not, and this be-
havior would result in an equilibrium. However, the following
result shows that such an intuitive equilibrium for global games
with noisy sharing of information does not exist.
Theorem 1. Consider the global game with noisy sharing
of information as described in Definition 1. Then, there do
not exist threshold values t1, . . . , tn such that the policy
(1θ¯1(y1)6t1 , . . . , 1θ¯n(yn)6tn) is an equilibrium.
B. Existence of a Threshold Policy Equilibrium
In light of Theorem 1, one may pose the question as how one
can extend the existence of threshold policies for condition-
ally independent signals to the case of interdependent private
signals. Here, we show that indeed we can extend such an
existence result to the case of global games with sharing of
information.
Before presenting this result, the notion of threshold policies
is extended from the case of a scalar private information to
multi-dimension information vector. Consider the information
available to agent i, i.e., yi = (xi, {yji}j∈[n]\{i}). For a
function h : Rn → R, we will be focusing on the symmetric
threshold strategies 1h(yi)>0. A strategy is called symmetric if it
does not depend on the index of the agents. Namely, in this case,
the function h is the same for all the agents. We will further
limit our attention to the class of functions h : Rn → R which
are continuous and strictly decreasing with respect to any of the
n input parameters, while the other input parameters are fixed.
Monotone strategies are natural candidates to consider because
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if taking risky action is not appealing for a given observation,
it is natural to consider strategies that assign the safe action to
any larger observation. More precisely, let y′i be smaller than yi
component-wise. If agent i takes a risky action by observing
yi, it is intuitively expected that it takes the risky action by
observing y′i as well. In other words, assuming a threshold
strategy 1h(yi)>0, we expect that if h(yi) > 0, then h(y′i) > 0.
A symmetry condition on h is also required which will be
clarified later in this section.
With this, the main existence results of this paper are stated
in the next two theorems.
Theorem 2. Let h : Rn → R be a continuous and component-
wise strictly decreasing function. Then h leads to a threshold
policy equilibrium if it is the solution to a certain functional
equation characterized by the noise variance parameters of the
system.
Theorem 3. For any given n, there exists an unbounded
set of parameters Θ ⊂ R+2 such that for any (σ, τ) ∈
Θ there exists a symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
(1h(y1)>0, . . . , 1h(yn)>0) for some continuous and component-
wise decreasing function h : Rn → R. Furthermore, h can be
approximated with an arbitrary precision (in L∞ norm).
The proof of Theorem 3 will be based on defining a con-
traction mapping on the space of feasible strategy functions h
and then utilizing Banach fixed point theorem to establish the
existence of h that solves the functional equation of Theorem 2.
Consequently, it is shown that an iterative method of applying
the contraction mapping will result in the convergence to the
desired h which can be used as an approximation method to
find h with arbitrary precision.
We will also characterize a sufficient condition on the noise
parameters (σ, τ) to be contained in the set Θ of Theorem 3. In
particular, it is shown that for a fixed ratio of r = τσ , (σ, rσ) ∈
Θ, for large enough σ. This implies that the set Θ is unbounded
in any direction and the set Θc is bounded in any dierction.
Roughly speaking, for a sufficiently noisy environment there
exists a threshold type Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
One may conjecture that Theorem 3 should hold for the
whole set of noise parameters and it should be independent
from the noise parameters, i.e., Θ = R+2. However, we indeed
conjecture that such a symmetric equilibrium does not exist for
arbitrary σ, τ > 0.
The above three theorems suggest that in the settings that
global games are relevant, one can not be oblivious to the
information structure details and only relies on the estimate of
the underlying fundamental θ.
IV. PROOFS
In this section, we provide the proof of the main results
discussed in Section III.
The following calculations for the statistics of conditional
Gaussian random vectors are needed in the proof of the main
results. Next lemma derives the probability distribution of θ
conditioned on the observation vector yi of the i-th agent.
Lemma 4. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Let η2n be a scalar
such that
1
η2n
=
1
σ2
+
n− 1
σ2 + τ2
.
Further, let an :=
η2n
σ2 and bn :=
η2n
σ2+τ2 . Then, conditioned on
agent i’s observation yi, θ is given by
θ = anxi + bnzi + εθ,
where εθ is a N (0, η2n) Gaussian random variable independent
of yi.
The proof can be found in Appendix.
To investigate the existence of a threshold policy for agent i,
we further need to derive the distribution of agent k’s observa-
tion vector yk given agent i’s observation yi. In a sense, this is
agent i’s perception of what is available to agent k.
Lemma 5. Let Assumption 1 hold. Further, let
1
γ2n
=
1
τ2
+
1
η2n−1 + σ2
,
and define cn :=
γ2n
η2n−1+σ2
and dn :=
γ2n
τ2 . Then, conditioned on
yi, we can write yk = (xk, {ylk}l∈[n]\{k}) as jointly Gaussian
random variables defined by:
xk = xk + εk, yik = xi + εik, ylk = ylk + εlk,
where l 6= i and1{
xk = cnan−1xi + dnyki + cnbn−1
∑
j∈[n]\{i,k} yji,
ylk = cnan−1xi + dnyli + cnbn−1
∑
j∈[n]\{i,l} yji,
(5)
and (εk, {εlk}l∈[n]\{k}) are jointly zero mean Gaussian ran-
dom variables independent of (xi, {yji}j∈[n]\{i}); and εik is
N (0, τ2) independent of  := (εk, {εlk}l∈[n]\{i,k}).
The proof can be found in Appendix.
A. Proof of Theorem 1
The underlying idea of the proof can be summarized as fol-
lows. Assume to the contrary that (1θ¯1(y1)6t1 , . . . , 1θ¯n(yn)6tn)
is an equilibrium for some t1, . . . , tn ∈ R, where θ¯i(yi) =
anxi + bnzi by Lemma 4. Then the best response strategy of
agent i, given the strategies of other agents 1anxj+bnzj6t1 is
given by (2). This must be equivalent to 1anxi+bnzi6t1 by the
definition of the Bayesian Nash equlibrium. However, we use
the non-singularity of the system of linear equations describing
the noise variances to show that this can not happen resulting in
a contradiction.
Let βn, γn, δn be defined as follows:
βn := bn + ancnan−1 + (n− 2)bncnan−1
γn := andn + (n− 2)bncnbn−1
δn := ancnbn−1 + bndn + (n− 3)bncnbn−1
1Note that xk and ylk are functions of the observation vector yi of agent i
but the dependence is left implicit for brevity.
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Then let V = [vij ]n×n be a matrix with the following entries:
vij =

an, if i = 1, j = 1,
bn, if i = 1, 1 < j 6 n,
βn, if 1 < i 6 n, j = 1,
γn, if 1 < i = j 6 n,
δn, if 1 < i 6= j 6 n,
.
In other words, V has the following structure:
V =

an bn bn . . . bn
βn γn δn . . . δn
βn δn γn . . . δn
...
...
...
. . .
...
βn δn δn . . . γn
 .
By Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, we have(
θ¯i(yi),
{
E
[
θ¯j(yj) | yi
]}
j 6=i
)
= V yTi (6)
It is assumed that τ > 0, i.e., information sharing between
agents is noisy and not perfect. This leads to an > bn and
consequently γn > δn. We next show that this implies that V
is non-singular. By subtracting the first column of V scaled by
δn/βn from all other columns we get
V ′ =

an bn − δnβn an bn − δnβn an . . . bn − δnβn an
βn γn − δn 0 . . . 0
βn 0 γn − δn . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
βn 0 0 . . . γn − δn
 .
It can be observed that bn − δnan/βn < 0 and hence, by
subtracting the first row scaled by βnan from the other rows, V
′ is
made lower triangular with strictly positive diagonal elements.
Therefore, V ′ and consequently V are non-singular.
Using the fact that V is non-singular together with (6) one
can find yi ∈ Rn such that θ¯i(yi) = anxi + bnzi = ti − ,
for an arbitrary  > 0, and E
[
θ¯j(yj) | yi
]
> M , for j 6= i, for
any arbitrarily large number M ∈ R+. Note that the variance
of θ¯j(yj) given yi is a constant function of σ2 and τ2 (by
Lemma 5). Therefore, using Chebyshev’s inequality, for the
given threshold values t1, . . . , tn, one can find yi ∈ Rn such
that θ¯i(yi) = ti −  and
P (θ¯j(yj) 6 tj | yi) 6 .
But by the structure of an equilibrium (2), we should have
(n− 1)+ 1 >
∑
j 6=i
P (θ¯j(yj) 6 tj | yi) + 1
> θ¯i(yi) = ti − .
Since the above inequality must hold for any  > 0, we have
ti 6 1.
On the other hand, using the same argument for any  > 0,
one can find yi such that θ¯i(yi) = ti +  and E
[
θ¯j(yj) | yi
]
<
−M , for j 6= i, for any arbitrarily large number M ∈ R+.
Hence,
ti +  > θ¯i(yi)
> E(
∑
j 6=i
1θ¯j(yj)6tj | yi) + 1
> 1 + (1− )(n− 1) = n− (n− 1).
Since, this holds for any  > 0, it follows that ti > n which
contradicts ti 6 1. Therefore, such a threshold equilibrium does
not exist.
The above proof can be extended to a more general case of
utility functions that are monotone with respect to the actions of
the players and also are continuous functions of the underlying
fundamental θ.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We start by introducing the set of threshold policies that we
will be focusing on. Such policies are characterized by certain
threshold functions. We impose some natural constraints on
the threshold function h. The description of the best response
strategies, formulated in (2), provides a necessary condition
on h that leads to threshold-type Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
This condition can be interpreted as h being a fixed point to a
certain functional equation resulting from (2). Then we exploit
natural properties of h, such as being continuous, monotone
,and symmetric, to conclude that such condition is also suffi-
cient for having a threshold-type Bayesian Nash equilibrium
characterized by h.
Consider the information available to agent i, i.e., yi =
(xi, {yji}j∈[n]\{i}). For a function h : Rn → R, we will be
focusing on the threshold strategies 1h(yi)>0. We will further
limit our attention to the class of functions h : Rn → R which
are continuous and strictly decreasing with respect to any of
the n input parameters, while the other input parameters are
fixed. A symmetry condition on h is also required which will
be clarified later in this section.
The goal is to show there exists, under some conditions
on noise parameters σ2, τ2, a function h : Rn → R with
the above conditions, such that the strategy profile s =
(1h(y1)>0, . . . , 1h(yn)>0) is an equilibrium for the global games
with noisy sharing of information, where si = 1h(yi)>0 is the
threshold policy that prescribes:{
αi = 1 if h(yi) > 0
αi = 0 if h(yi) < 0
(7)
for agent i. We refer to such a function h as a threshold function,
and we refer to the resulting symmetric strategy profile
s = (1h(y1)>0, . . . , 1h(yn)>0) (8)
as a symmetric threshold policy. If the strategy profile given in
(8) is an equilibrium for the underlying game, we say that the
threshold function h leads to a (symmetric) threshold policy
equilibrium.
By the definition of a (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium, the
function h leads to a threshold policy equilibrium if a best
response of any agent i ∈ [n] is characterized by the threshold
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policy described in (7). In other words, we have
1 +
∑
k∈[n]\{i}
P
(
h(yk) > 0 | yi
)
> E(θ | yi)
= anxi + bnzi
(9)
if and only if h(yi) > 0, for any i ∈ [n], where zi is given in
(4).
Remark. It is shown in Theorem 1 that an equilibrium with
a threshold policy on E(θ|yi) does not exist. In light of the
definition of threshold functions provided here, this result can
be stated as the threshold function h(x, y) = anx + bny + c,
where c ∈ R is a constant, does not lead to a threshold policy
equilibrium. We emphasize that our definition of a threshold
function only considers a symmetric threshold policy (if it
exists), where all agents take actions according to the same
threshold function h.
Consider a continuous threshold function h that leads to a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. It can be observed that if h(yi) =
0, then (9) also turns into equality. In other words, we have
anxi + bnzi = 1 +
∑
k∈[n]\{i}
P
(
h(yk) > 0|yi
)
. (10)
Note that given the parameters of the system, the right hand side
of (10) can be regarded as an operation on the function h. The
definition of this operation will be provided later in this section.
This motivates us to define a fixed point threshold function as
follows:
Definition2. We say that h : Rn → R is a fixed point threshold
function if for any choice of yi = (xi, {yji}j∈[n]\{i}), we have
h(yi) = 0 if and only if (10) also holds.
We note here that a fixed point threshold function h(·) is
not necessarily unique. In fact, the set of transition points {r |
h(r) = 0} plays a central role in defining the strategy profile as
in (8), rather than h itself. Any other strictly decreasing function
g that has the same set of transition points defines the same
strategy profile as h does.
For notational convenience, we let
yi\k := (xi, {yji}j∈[n]\{i,k})
for i, k ∈ [n]. Note that if h : Rn → R is a continuous
fixed point threshold function, then for any k ∈ [n] \ {i} and
yi\k, there exists yki ∈ R such that h(yi) = 0, where yi is
defined in (3). The reason is that the right hand side of (10)
is bounded between 1 and n, while the left hand side of (10)
is unbounded in terms of yki ∈ R, while (xi, {yji}j∈[n]\{i,k})
is fixed. Therefore, there exists yki ∈ R such that (10) turns
into equality and since h is a fixed point threshold function,
by definition, h(yi) = 0. We let Ih(xi, {yji}j∈[n]\{i,k}) to
denote the solution yki for h(yi) = 0. Furthermore, if h is
strictly decreasing with respect to any of its input parameters,
Ih(xi, {yji}j∈[n]\{i,k}) is unique. In fact, Ih : Rn−1 → R is
also a strictly decreasing function.
As mentioned before, the function h is not unique, however,
Ih is unique under some additional conditions. Therefore,
instead of explicit characterization of h, we will be solving the
fixed point equation for Ih and then, we pick h as follows:
h(yi) := Ih(yi\k)− yki (11)
As discussed earlier, a symmetry condition on h with respect
to {yji}j∈[n]\{i} is naturally needed in order to have a sym-
metric threshold policy equilibrium. In fact all the other agents
look the same to the agent i and the observations {yji}j∈[n]\{i}
follow the same model, as illustrated in Figure 1, hence the
indexing of other agents should not matter. The symmetry
condition can be that h(yi) is the same if {yji}j∈[n]\{i} is
permuted. However, this is too general for our purpose and h
as constructed in (11) may not satisfy this condition. In fact
the symmetry condition only matters when h(y) = 0, because
the threshold policy will be uniquely determined given the set
of solutions for h(y) = 0 when h is strictly decreasing. The
symmetry condition is then defined as follows:
Definition3. We say that h : Rn → R is a symmetric threshold
function if for any root y = (xi, {yji}j∈[n]\{i}) of h, y with a
permuted {yji}j∈[n]\{i} is also a root of h.
Note that if h is strictly decreasing and symmetric fixed point
function, the function Ih : Rn−1 → R does not depend on the
choice of index k.
The following theorem is the main result of this section and
presents a sufficient condition on h to be a threshold function.
Theorem 6. Let h : Rn → R be strictly decreasing and sym-
metric fixed point threshold function according to Definition 2.
Then h leads to a threshold policy equilibrium.
Proof. For i ∈ [n], let yi = (xi, {yji}j∈[n]\{i}) denote the
observations of agent i. We fix i and consider two different
cases:
Case 1: h(yi) > 0.
Note that Ih : Rn−1 → R is a strictly decreasing function and
h(yk) > 0 if and only if yik 6 Ih(xk, {ylk}l∈[n]\{i,k}). Using
Lemma 5 we have
P
(
h(yk) > 0 | yi
)
= P
(
yik 6 Ih(yk\i) | yi
)
,
= P
(
xi + εik 6 Ih(xk + εk, {ylk + εlk}l∈[n]\{i,k})
)
,
(12)
where xk and ylk are the means of xk and ylk condi-
tioned on yi, respectively, and are derived in (5). Let  =(
εk, {εlk}l∈[n]\{i,k}
)
and f() denote the joint probability
density function (PDF) of the Gaussian random variables
(εk, {εlk}l∈[n]\{i,k}). By Lemma 5, εik is independent of  and
thus, (12) can be rewritten as in (13), shown on top of the next
page.
In (13), ϕ is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
the normal distribution with unit variance. For j ∈ [n] \ {i}, let
y′ji > yji such that h(y′i) = 0, where y′i = (xi, {y′ji}j∈[n]\{i}).
Let also xk′ and ylk′ be defined with respect to xi and y′ji as
in Lemma 5. Then by following the same arguments and by
noting that yik = xi + εik does not change while changing
yji to y′ji, (14) follows, where y
′
i = (xi, {y′ji}j∈[n]\{i}).
Observe that xk 6 xk′ and ylk 6 ylk′. Also, note that Ih is a
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P
(
h(yk) > 0 | yi
)
=
∫
Rn−1
ϕ
(1
τ
(Ih(xk + εk, {ylk + εlk}l∈[n]\{i,k})− xi)
)
f()d (13)
P
(
h(yk) > 0 | y′i
)
=
∫
Rn−1
ϕ
(1
τ
(Ih(x′k + εk, {y′lk + εlk}l∈[n]\{i,k})− xi)
)
f()d, (14)
decreasing function and ϕ is an increasing function. Therefore,
(13) together with (14) imply that
P
(
h(yk) > 0 | yi
)
> P
(
h(yk) > 0 | y′i
)
. (15)
By summing (15) over all k ∈ [n]\{i} and using the fixed point
property of h at (xi, {y′ji}j∈[n]\{i}) as described in Definition 2,
we get
1 +
∑
k∈[n]\{i}
P
(
h(yk) > 0 | yi
)
> 1 +
∑
k∈[n]\{i}
P
(
h(yk) > 0 | y′i
)
= anxi + bn
∑
j∈[n]\{i}
y′ji > anxi + bnzi
= E(θ | yi).
(16)
Therefore, the best response of agent i is to take the risky action.
Case 2: h(yi) < 0.
In this case we take y′ji < yji such that h(y
′
i) = 0. The
inequalities in (15) and (16) will be reversed and the best
response of agent i is to take the safe action. This will complete
the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
In this section, we analyze the convergence of an iterative
scheme for finding the threshold function and consequently the
threshold policy equilibrium. To this end, a certain operator T
is defined that captures the update of a threshold policy when
agents update their strategy according to the best response strat-
egy rule. Sufficient conditions are derived to guarantee that the
operator T becomes a contraction mapping. Then the Banach
fixed point theorem is utilized to show the convergence of an
iterative scheme, that applies T iteratively to an initial function,
to a fixed-point threshold function. Then Theorem 2 is utilized
to show that such threshold function results in a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. This complete the proof of Theorem 3.
As the first step, we find Ih such that the threshold function
h, as derived in (11), satisfies the conditions of Theorem 6. By
replacing yki with Ih(yi\k) in (10) and using derivation of
P
(
h(yk) > 0 | yi
)
in (13), (10) can be turned into a fixed
point equation for the function Ih. Let
g(yi\k) := anxi + bnIh(yi\k) + bn
∑
j∈[n]\{k,i}
yji. (17)
Note that g(yi\k) is simply the left-hand side of (10). We finally
arrive at the definition for the fixed point function g : Rn−1 →
R as follows.
Definition4. We call g : Rn−1 → R with the input y ∈ Rn−1
to be a fixed point function if
g(y) = 1 +
∑
l∈[n]\{i}
∫
Rn−1
ϕ (M,lg(y)) f()d, (18)
where f() denote the joint probability density function (PDF)
of the Gaussian random variables (εl, {εjl}j∈[n]\{i,l}) and
M,lg : Rn−1 → R is defined as
M,lg(y) = 1
bnτ
(
g(xl + εl, {yjl + εjl}j∈[n]\{i,l})
− an(xl + εl)− bn
∑
j∈[n]\{i,l}
(yjl + εjl)− bnxi
)
,
(19)
where xl and yjl are the means of xl and yjl derived in (5) in
terms of yi\k = y and
yki =
1
bn
g(yi\k)− an
bn
xi −
∑
j∈[n]\{k,i}
yji.
Definition5. We define the operator T to be the operator that
maps a sufficiently well-behaved function g : Rn−1 → R to
T g : Rn−1 → R defined by
T g(y) :=1 +
∑
l∈[n]\{i}
∫
Rn−1
ϕ(M,lg(y))f()d, (20)
whereM,l is defined in (19).
If g is a fixed point function, according to Definition 4, then
T g = g, by definition of T g in (20). Therefore, finding a fixed
point function g is equivalent to finding a fixed point for the
operator T .
In the subsequent discussion, we will derive conditions that
will characterize the term sufficiently well-behaved in the above
statement. First we notice that T can be viewed as a mapping
that maps the space of measurable functions g : Rn−1 → [1, n]
to itself. This follows from the fact that ϕ(α) ∈ [0, 1] for all
α ∈ R.
To find a fixed point for the operator T , the structure of
the fixed point equation (20) suggests the investigation of the
iteration
g(t+1) = T g(t), (21)
for some sufficiently well-behaved initial function g(0). Indeed,
we will prove that T induces a contraction mapping on the
space C0(Rn−1, [1, n]) and hence, converges to a unique fixed
point. Throughout our discussion, C0(Rn−1, [1, n]) is the space
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of continuous functions from Rn−1 to [1, n] embedded with the
uniform norm:
‖g1 − g2‖ := sup
y∈Rn−1
|g1(y)− g2(y)|.
Once the fixed point function g is found, Ih is derived from g
according to (17) and then h is derived from Ih as in (11). How-
ever, we will need h to be symmetric according to Definition 3.
If a function g : Rn−1 → R leads to a symmetric h : Rn → R
through the mentioned transformations, then g is called a quasi-
symmetric function. Note that if g is quasi-symmetric, then T g
is also quasi-symmetric. Because the definition of T suggests
that it is independent of the labeling of indices l ∈ [n] \ {i}
and also there is a symmetry between Ih(yi\k) and yji, for
j ∈ [n] \ {k, i} in (17). Therefore, we limit our attention to
the set of quasi-symmetric functions.
Moreover, in order to make sure that g leads to a strictly
decreasing Ih and consequently a threshold function h, we
impose a stronger condition on g. The Lipschitz continuity is
imposed on g : Rn−1 → R, where Rn−1 is embedded with the
L1 norm. We show that the Lipschitz continuity with parameter
an is preserved through T under certain conditions, i.e., we
require that for any yi\k, y′i\k ∈ Rn−1:
|g(yi\k)− g(y′i\k)| 6 an|xi − x′i|+ an
∑
j∈[n]\{k,i}
|yji − y′ji|.
(22)
Let F denote the space of all Lipschitz continuous functions
f with parameter an which are also quasi-symmetric. We aim
at characterizing a condition on the noise variance parameters
of the system such that the Lipschitz continuity is preserved
through the operation T . In other words T (F) ⊆ F , where
T (F) = {T (g) : g ∈ F}.
The following lemma establishes a sufficient condition on the
parameters of the system to preserve the Lipschitz continuity
through the operation T . The Lipschitz continuity of g is used
to show Lipschitz continuity of M,lg, and consequently the
Lipschitz continuity of T g, where the Lipschitz continuity of
φ(.) together with triangle inequality are used. Furthermore,
an upper bound on the Lipschitz constant ofM,lg and conse-
quently on T g are derived in terms of the Lipschitz constant of
g and other parameters of the system. That leads to a sufficient
condition for not increasing the Lipschitz constant through the
operation T , described in the following lemma. Let
en := max{cnan−1, dn, cnbn−1}. (23)
Lemma 7. If
(n− 1)(en(nan + (n− 2)bn)(bn + 2an) + b2n)
anb2n
6 τ, (24)
then Lipschitz continuity with parameter an is preserved
through the operation T .
Proof. Let y, y′ ∈ Rn−1. Then by definition of operation T ,
T g(y)− T g(y′)
=
∑
l∈[n]\{i}
∫
Rn−1
(
ϕ(M,lg(y))− ϕ(M,lg(y′))
)
f()d.
(25)
Observe that |ϕ(A) − ϕ(B)| 6 |A − B| for any A,B ∈ R.
Therefore,
|T g(y)− T g(y′)|
6
∑
l∈[n]\{i}
∫
Rn−1
|ϕ(M,lg(y))− ϕ(M,lg(y′))|f()d
6
∑
l∈[n]\{i}
∫
Rn−1
|M,lg(y)−M,lg(y′)|f()d.
(26)
Let δ = ‖y − y′‖1. In the following series of inequalities,
we only use the Lipschitz continuity of g as given in (22) and
triangle inequality. For any l ∈ [n] \ {i} and  ∈ Rn−1,
bnτ
∣∣M,lg(y)−M,lg(y′)∣∣
6 |g(xl + εl, {yjl + εjl}j∈[n]\{i,l})
− g(xl′ + εl, {yjl′ + εjl}j∈[n]\{i,l})|+ an|xl − xl′|
+ bn
∑
j∈\[n]{i,l}
|yjl − yjl′|+ bnδ
6 2an|xl − xl′|+ (an + bn)
∑
j∈[n]\{i,l}
|yjl − yjl′|+ bnδ
(27)
where xl and yjl are derived in (5) with yi\k = y and yki =
1
bn
g(yi\k)− anbn xi−
∑
j∈[n]\{k,i} yji, according to Definition 4.
Also, xl′ and yjl′ are derived similarly. Then we have
|xl − xl′| 6 enδ + en|yki − y′ki|
6 en(1 +
an
bn
)δ +
en
bn
|g(yi\k)− g(y′i\k)|
6 en(1 +
2an
bn
)δ,
(28)
where in the last inequality we used the Lipschitz continuity of
g. Similarly, we have
|yjl − yjl′| 6 en(1 + 2an
bn
)δ. (29)
By combining (27), (28) and (29) we have
bnτ
∣∣M,lg(yi\k)−M,lg(y′i\k)∣∣
6 1
bn
(
en(nan + (n− 2)bn)(bn + 2an) + b2n
)
δ.
(30)
This together with (26) imply that
|T g(yi\k)− T g(y′i\k)|
6
(n− 1)(en(nan + (n− 2)bn)(bn + 2an) + b2n)
b2nτ
δ.
Therefore, a sufficient condition on T g for being Lipschitz
continuous with parameter an is that
(n− 1)(en(nan + (n− 2)bn)(bn + 2an) + b2n)
b2nτ
6 an.
which completes the proof.
Suppose that the parameters of the system satisfy (24). First
notice that since ϕ(α) ∈ [0, 1], it follows that T g(y) ∈ [1, n]
for all y ∈ Rn−1. Therefore, one can view T as a mapping
T : F ∩ C0(Rn−1, [0, n]) → F ∩ C0(Rn−1, [1, n]). The fol-
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lowing lemma builds upon Lemma 7 and exploits the Lipschitz
continuity of g, which is preserved through the operation T , to
show that T is indeed a contraction mapping for a certain set of
parameters.
Lemma 8. For any two functions g, h ∈ T (F),
‖T g1−T g2‖ 6 (n− 1)(en(nan + (n− 2)bn) + bn)
b2nτ
‖g1−g2‖.
Proof. For any y ∈ Rn−1,
T g1(y)− T g2(y)
=
∑
l∈[n]\{i}
∫
Rn−1
(
ϕ(M,lg1(y)− ϕ(M,lg2(y))
)
f()d
6
∑
l∈[n]\{i}
∫
Rn−1
|M,lg1(y))−M,lg2(y)|f()d
6
∑
l∈[n]\{i}
sup
∈Rn−1
|M,lg1(y))−M,lg2(y′)|.
(31)
For any  ∈ Rn−1 and l ∈ [n] \ {i}, by definition of M,lg1
andM,lg2 in (19) and triangle inequality we have
bnτ |M,lg1(yi\k)− (M,lg2(yi\k)|
6|g1(x1l + εl, {y1jl + εjl}j∈[n]\{i,l})
− g2(x2l + εl, {y2jl + εjl}j∈[n]\{i,l})|
+ an|x1l − x2l |+ bn
∑
j∈[n]\{i,l}
|y1jl − y2jl|,
(32)
where xml and y
m
jl , for m = 1, 2, are derived in (5) with yi\k =
y and yki = 1bn gm(yi\k)− anbn xi −
∑
j∈[n]\{k,i} yji, according
to Definition 4. Note that, for y, y′ ∈ Rn−1,
|g1(y)− g2(y′)| 6 |g1(y)− g1(y′)|+ |g1(y′)− g2(y′)|
6 an‖y − y′‖1 + ‖g1 − g2‖,
(33)
where we used Lemma 7 for Lipschitz continuity of g1 with
parameter an and the triangle inequality. Using (33) in (32) we
get
bnτ |M,lg1(yi\k)− (M,lg2(yi\k)|
6 2an|x1l − x2l |+ (an + bn)
∑
j∈[n]\{i,l}
|y1jl − y2jl|+ ‖g1 − g2‖.
(34)
Also,
|x1l − x2l | 6
en
bn
|g1(yi\k)− g2(yi\k)| 6 en
bn
‖g1 − g2‖, (35)
and similarly,
|y2jl − y2jl| 6
en
bn
‖g1 − g2‖. (36)
Therefore, (34), (35) and (36) together imply that
bnτ |M,lg1(yi\k)− (M,lg2(yi\k)|
6 (nanen
bn
+ (n− 2)en + 1)‖g1 − g2‖.
This together with (31) imply that
T g1(y)− T g2(y)
6 (n− 1)(en(nan + (n− 2)bn) + bn)
b2nτ
‖g1 − g2‖,
which completes the proof of lemma.
Let
wn = max
{ (n− 1)(en(nan + (n− 2)bn) + bn)
b2n
,
(n− 1)(en(nan + (n− 2)bn)(bn + 2an) + b2n)
anb2n
}
(37)
If wn < τ , then the conditions of Lemma 7 and Lemma 8
are both satisfied. Hence, if g is Lipschitz continuous with
parameter an, then so is T g by Lemma 7. Then by Lemma 8,
we have
‖T g1 − T g2‖ 6 wn
τ
‖g1 − g2‖.
In other words, if wn < τ , then T is a contraction mapping
over F , with parameter wn/τ < 1. This leads to the following
theorem.
Theorem 9. Letwn < τ . Then the sequence of functions {g(t)}
defined by (21), where g(0) ∈ F , converges to a unique fixed
point g = T g in the space F embedded with the L∞ norm.
Proof. Let wn < τ . Then by Lemma 8, T would be a con-
traction mapping over F with L∞ norm (which is a complete
space) and hence, the result follows immediately by the Banach
Fixed Point Theorem [24].
The following theorem is the main result of this section.
Theorem 10. If wn < τ , then there exists a continuous thresh-
old function h : Rn → R that leads to a threshold policy equi-
librium. Furthermore, h(y) can be numerically approximated
with arbitrarily enough precision, with respect to L∞ norm.
Proof. The proof follows from Theorem 6, Lemma 7 and
Theorem 9. The continuity of g (and hence, h) follows from
the fact that if the above condition holds, then T would be a
contraction mapping from F ∩ C0(Rn−1, [1, n]) to itself and
F ∩ C0(Rn−1, [1, n]) is a closed subset of C0(Rn−1, [1, n]).
Therefore, the iterations converge to a function in F which is
(Lipschitz) continuous.
Regarding the conditions on the noise variance parameters
it should be noted that for a fixed ratio of r = τσ , the pa-
rameters an, bn, cn, dn, introduced in Lemma 4 and Lemma 5,
en, defined in (23), and wn, defined in (37), are all also
fixed. Therefore, one can fix r while scaling τ and σ with a
large enough constant c in order to have wn < τ . Roughly
speaking, for a sufficiently noisy environment the condition of
Theorem 10 holds.
Let Θ denote the set of all (σ2, τ2) ∈ R+2 for which the
threshold policy equilibrium exists. By Theorem 10, if wn < τ ,
a condition fully characterized by σ, τ and n, then (σ2, τ2) ∈
Θ. Therefore, Θ is an unbounded set, indeed in any direction,
as discussed above. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Remark. Let
vn =
(n− 1)(en(nan + (n− 2)bn) + bn)
b2nτ
.
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Figure 2. The iterative solution g(x) for σ2 = 1 and τ2 = 9.
Then by Lemma 8 the Lipschitz constant of T is upper bounded
by vn. Note that the condition wn < τ , the condition of Theo-
rem 9 and Theorem 10, also imply that vn < 1. Therefore, the
L∞ distance between the function hm after m iterations of the
contraction mapping T and the symmetric threshold function
h, which is the fixed point of T , is O(vmn ). Given fixed noise
parameters σ and τ , the parameter vn is an increasing function
of n. This implies that the speed of convergence is decreasing
with the increase in the number of agents. In other words, as
n increases, we will need more iterations to get the same level
of precision for the approximation of the symmetric threshold
function h.
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we consider the simple case of a global game
with two agents, i.e., n = 2 for a numerical analysis. In
this case, the independent noisy observations are x1 and x2.
Furthermore, agent 1 observes y1 = x2 + ζ21 and agent 2
observes y2 = x2 + ζ12. In Theorem 2, we proved that there
is a coordinated equilibrium strategy of the form
s = (1h(x1,y1)>0, 1h(x2,y2)>0),
for some continuous and strictly decreasing function h : R2 →
R, under the condition provided in Theorem 10 which can be
reformulated as
4a2 + 3a− 1
a(1− a) 6 τ, (38)
where a = a2 = σ
2+τ2
2σ2+τ2 . Furthermore, the convergence
method presented in Section IV-C can be used to find Ih : R→
R such that
h(x, y) = Ih(x)− y
is a fixed point threshold function.
While (38) is a sufficient condition to establish the conver-
gence, it is not a necessary condition. In fact, the set Θ of all
(σ, τ) ∈ R+2 for which the threshold policy equilibrium exists
may contain points (σ, τ) that do not satisfy (38). This is shown
for a simple numerical example. Let σ = 1 and τ = 3. It can be
observed that this certain choice of (σ, τ) does not satisfy (38).
For simplicity, the fixed point equation is solved for the function
g(x) = ax+ bIh(x)−1, which is slightly modified comparing
to (17). In the simulations, we demonstrate the convergence
of solution g(x) of (21) after only eight iterations, shown in
Figure 2.
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Then by Le ma 8 the Lipschitz constant of T is u per bounded
by vn. Note that the condition wn < ⌧ , the condition of Theo-
rem 9 and Theorem 10, also imply that vn < 1. Therefore, the
L1 distance between the function hm after m iterations of the
contraction mapping T and the symmetric threshold function
h, which is the fixed point of T , is O(vmn ). Given fixed noise
parameters   and ⌧ , the parameter vn is an increasing function
of n. This implies that the speed of convergence is decreasing
with the increase in the number of agents. In other words, as
n increases, we will need more iterations to get the same level
of precision for the approximation of the symmetric threshold
function h.
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we consider the simple case of a global game
with two agents, i.e., n = 2 for a numerical analysis. In
this case, the independent noisy observations are x1 and x2.
Furthermore, agent 1 observes y1 = x2 + ⇣21 and agent 2
observes y2 = x2 + ⇣12. In Theorem 2, we proved that there
is a coordinated equilibrium strategy of the form
s = (1h(x1,y1)>0, 1h(x2,y2)>0),
for some continuous and strictly decreasing function h : R2 !
R, under the condition provided in Theorem 10 which can be
reformulated as
4a2 + 3a  1
a(1  a) 6 ⌧, (38)
where a = a2 =  
2+⌧2
2 2+⌧2 . Furthermore, the convergence
method presented in Section IV-C can be used to find Ih : R!
R such that
h(x, y) = Ih(x)  y
is a fixed point threshold function.
While (38) is a sufficient condition to establish the conver-
gence, it is not a necessary condition. In fact, the set ⇥ of all
( , ⌧) 2 R+2 for which the threshold policy equilibrium exists
may contain points ( , ⌧) that do not satisfy (38). This is shown
for a simple numerical example. Let   = 1 and ⌧ = 3. It can be
observed that this certain choice of ( , ⌧) does not satisfy (38).
For simplicity, the fixed point quation is s lved for the function
g(x) = ax+ bIh( ) 1, which is slightly modified compari g
to (17). In the simulations, we demonstrate th converge ce
of solution g(x) of (21) after only eight iterations, show in
Figure 2.
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Figure 3. The iterative convergence for different values of number of agents n
Next we evaluate the effect of number of agents on the
convergence of the iterative operation to a fixed point solu-
tion g(x). As briefly discussed in Section IV-C, increasing the
number of agents slows down the convergence. Furthermore,
given that the noise variance parameters are fixed, it is expected
that convergence happens up to a certain n0 and for n > n0,
the iteration does not converge. We have observed this through
numerical simulations. In these simulations, we have limited
our attention to functions g(.) : R2 ! R that are functions
of agent’s private observation as well as the aggregate sum
of all the other observations. While our theoretical analysis in
Section IV does not guarantee that the fixed point solution is
of this certain form, we have observed the convergence given
this additional constraint. It is also possible that there exists a
more strict set of conditions to guarantee the existence of a fixed
point solution given this additional constraint. Let   = 10 and
⌧ = 30. In Figure 3 the convergence of the iterative process for
different values of the number of agents n is shown. The initial
function is g(0) = 0 on the entire R2. Then g(t+1) = T (g(t)),
for t > 0, where T is defined Definition 5. The distance
between g(t+1) and g(t) is measured in terms of L2 norm. It can
be observed in Figure 3 that as the number of agents n increases,
the convergence slows down.
The effect of noise variance parameters on the convergence
Figure 3. The iterative convergence for different values of number of agents n
Next we evaluate the effect of number of agents on the
convergence of the iterative operation to a fixed point solu-
tion g(x). As briefly discussed in Section IV-C, increasing the
number of agents slows down the convergence. Furthermore,
given that the noise variance parameters are fixed, it is expected
that convergence happens up to a certain n0 and for n > n0,
the iteration does not converge. We have observed this through
numerical simulations. In these simulations, we have limited
our attention to functions g(.) : R2 → R that are functions
of agent’s private observation as well as the aggregate sum
of all the other observations. While our theoretical analysis in
Section IV does not guarantee that the fixed point solution is
of this certain form, we have observed the convergence given
this additional constraint. It is also possible that there exists a
more strict set of conditions to guarantee the existence of a fixed
point solution given this additional constraint. Let σ = 10 and
τ = 30. In Figure 3 the convergence of the iterative process for
different values of the number of agents n is shown. The initial
function is g(0) 0 on the entire R2. Then g(t+1) T (g(t)),
for t > 0, where T is defined efinition 5. The distance
between g(t+1) and g(t) is easured in ter s of 2 nor . It can
be observed in Figure 3 that as the nu ber of agents increases,
the convergence slo s do .
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of the iterative operations is also evaluated. The number of
agents is fixed to n = 5. Let
r =
 
⌧
=
1
3
. (39)
As mentioned in Section IV-C, the set of noise variance parame-
ters ( , ⌧) for which the iteration does not converge is bounded.
Let n = 3 and then the convergence for different values of   are
evaluated, assuming the ratio r is fixed as in (39). It is observed
that for   = 1, the convergence does not happen, however, it
happens for   = 3, 5, 10. Furthermore, the convergence for
  = 10 is faster than the cases   = 3, 5, as expected. The
results are shown in Figure 4.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied global games with noisy sharing
of information and the existence and the structure of equilibria
for those games. We showed that under some conditions on the
noise parameters of the system, there exists a unique threshold-
type equilibrium policy. To show this result, we formulated the
existence of such an equilibrium as an existence of a solution
to a functional fixed point equation. Using this formulation,
we showed that for a set of noise parameters, the fixed point
equation results in a contraction mapping on certain complete
spaces and hence, we obtain a unique equilibrium based on
threshold policies. Furthermore, such a contraction mapping
would also provide us with a natural approximation mechanism.
As discussed in SectionV, the conditions derived for existence
of the threshold-type equilibrium policy may not be necessary.
Therefore, characterizing the entire set of parameters for which
the threshold-type equilibrium policy exists is still an open
problem.
APPENDIX
The next lemma determines the posterior of the unknown
parameter given a bunch of independent Gaussian observations.
Lemma 11. Let ✓ be drawn from the non-informative uniform
prior on R. Further, let { i}i2[n] denote noisy observations of
✓ with additive zero-mean independent Gaussian noises with
variances { 2i }i2[n]. Let
1
 2✓
:=
X
i2[n]
1
 2i
. (40)
Then, conditioned on { i}i2[n], we can write ✓ as
✓ =  2✓
X
i2[n]
 i
 2i
+ z,
where z is N (0, 2✓) which is independent of { i}i2[n].
Proof. Notice that
f(✓ | { i}i2[n]) =
f({ i}i2[n] | ✓)R1
 1 f({ i}i2[n] | ↵)d↵
=
exp
⇣
 Pi2[n] ( i ✓)22 2i ⌘R1
 1 exp
⇣
 Pi2[n] ( i ↵)22 2i ⌘ d↵ . (41)
By inspecting the PDF in (41), it is clear that, conditioned
on { i}i2[n], ✓ follows a Gaussian distribution. It is therefore
sufficient to calculate its mean and its variance. Further notice
that X
i2[n]
1
 2i
(✓    i)2 = 1
 2✓
✓2   2
0@X
i2[n]
 i
 2i
1A ✓ + C1
=
1
 2✓
0@✓    2✓ X
i2[n]
 i
 2i
1A2 + C2,
where  2✓ is defined in (40), and C1 and C2 are constants with
respect to ✓ and only depends on ( 1, . . . , n). Hence,
f(✓ | { i}i2[n]) / exp
0B@  1
2 2✓
0@✓    2✓ X
i2[n]
 i
 2i
1A2
1CA ,
which leads to the desired result.
Proof of Lemma 4. Note that (xi, {yji}j2[n]\{i}) are zero-
mean independent Gaussian observations of ✓. Further,
E[x2i ] =  
2, whereas E[y2ji] =  
2 + ⌧2. Therefore, the result
follows by invoking Lemma 11 and noticing the definition of zi
in (4).
Proof of Lemma 5. Since ✓ follows a non-informative uni-
form prior on R, xk (or yjk) also follows a uniform prior on
R. Therefore, (xi, {yji}j2[n]\{i}) can be viewed as zero-mean
independent Gaussian observations of xk given the dependence
structure in Figure 1. Similarly, (xi, {yji}j2[n]\{i}) can be
viewed as independent zero mean observations of yjk for j 6= k.
Hence, we can invoke n instances of Lemma 11, where the state
of the world is given by xk, and yjk for j 6= k, respectively.
First, let us consider yik. Notice that given xi, we see that yik
is independent of all other observations {yli}l2[n]\{i}, and it is
a Gaussian observation of xi with noise variance ⌧2.
Next, consider xk. From the dependence structure in Fig-
ure 1, we see that xk depends on (xi, {yji}j2[n]\{i,k}) only
through ✓. Hence, by invoking Lemma 4 with (n 1), we obtain
the distribution of ✓ given (xi, {yji}j2[n]\{i,k}). Furthermore,
Figure 4. The iterative convergence for different values of noise variances and
n = 3
agents is fixed to n = 5. Let
r =
σ
τ
=
1
3
. (39)
As mentioned in Section IV-C, the set of noise variance parame-
ters (σ, τ) for which the iteration does not converge is bounded.
Let n = 3 and then the convergence for different values of σ are
evaluated, assuming the ratio r is fixed as in (39). It is observed
that for σ = 1, the convergence does not happen, however, it
happens for σ = 3, 5, 10. Furthermore, the convergence for
σ = 10 is faster than the cases σ = 3, 5, as expected. The
results are shown in Figure 4.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied global games with noisy sharing
of information and the existence and the structure of equilibria
for those games. We showed that under some conditions on the
noise parameters of the system, there exists a unique threshold-
type equilibrium policy. To show this result, we formulated the
existence of such an equilibrium as an existence of a solution
to a functional fixed point equation. Using this formulation,
we showed that for a set of noise parameters, the fixed point
equation results in a contraction mapping on certain complete
spaces and hence, we obtain a unique equilibrium based on
threshold policies. Furthermore, such a contraction mapping
would also provide us with a natural approximation mechanism.
As discussed in Section V, the conditions derived for existence
of the threshold-type equilibrium policy may not be necessary.
Therefore, characterizing the entire set of parameters for which
the threshold-type equilibrium policy exists is still an open
problem.
I
The next lemma determines the posterior of the unknown
parameter given a bunch of independent Gaussian observations.
Lemma 11. Let θ be drawn from the non-informative uniform
prior on R. Further, let {φi}i∈[n] denote noisy observations of
θ it itive zero- ean independent Gau sian noises with
ri s σ2i }i∈[n]. et
1
σ2θ
:
∑
i∈[n]
1
σ2i
. (40)
e , c itioned on {φi}i∈[n], we can write θ as
θ σ2θ
∑
i∈[n]
φi
σ2i
+ z,
here z is (0, σ2θ) hich is independent of {φi}i∈[n].
Proof. Notice that
f(θ | {φi}i∈[n]) =
f({φi}i∈[n] | θ)∫∞
−∞ f({φi}i∈[n] | α)dα
=
exp
(
−∑i∈[n] (φi−θ)22σ2i )∫∞
−∞ exp
(
−∑i∈[n] (φi−α)22σ2i ) dα. (41)
By inspecting the PDF in (41), it is clear that, conditioned
on {φi}i∈[n], θ follows a Gaussian distribution. It is therefore
sufficient to calculate its mean and its variance. Further notice
that ∑
i∈[n]
1
σ2i
(θ − φi)2 = 1
σ2θ
θ2 − 2
∑
i∈[n]
φi
σ2i
 θ + C1
=
1
σ2θ
θ − σ2θ ∑
i∈[n]
φi
σ2i
2 + C2,
where σ2θ is defined in (40), and C1 and C2 are constants with
respect to θ and only depends on (φ1, . . . , φn). Hence,
f(θ | {φi}i∈[n]) ∝ exp
− 1
2σ2θ
θ − σ2θ ∑
i∈[n]
φi
σ2i
2
 ,
which leads to the desired result.
Proof of Lemma 4. Note that (xi, {yji}j∈[n]\{i}) are zero-
mean independent Gaussian observations of θ. Further,
E[x2i ] = σ
2, whereas E[y2ji] = σ
2 + τ2. Therefore, the result
follows by invoking Lemma 11 and noticing the definition of zi
in (4).
Proof of Lemma 5. Since θ follows a non-informative uni-
form prior on R, xk (or yjk) also follows a uniform prior on
R. Therefore, (xi, {yji}j∈[n]\{i}) can be viewed as zero-mean
independent Gaussian observations of xk given the dependence
structure in Figure 1. Similarly, (xi, {yji}j∈[n]\{i}) can be
viewed as independent zero mean observations of yjk for j 6= k.
Hence, we can invoke n instances of Lemma 11, where the state
of the world is given by xk, and yjk for j 6= k, respectively.
First, let us consider yik. Notice that given xi, we see that yik
is independent of all other observations {yli}l∈[n]\{i}, and it is
a Gaussian observation of xi with noise variance τ2.
Next, consider xk. From the dependence structure in Fig-
ure 1, we see that xk depends on (xi, {yji}j∈[n]\{i,k}) only
through θ. Hence, by invoking Lemma 4 with (n−1), we obtain
the distribution of θ given (xi, {yji}j∈[n]\{i,k}). Furthermore,
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due to the non-informative prior, θ could be thought of as an
independent Gaussian observation of xk with noise variance σ2.
Thus, we invoke Lemma 11 to obtain the distribution of xk.
The procedure for ylk with l 6= i is similar and omitted for
brevity.
Finally, it is clear that, conditioned on xi, yik is independent
of all other {xj}j∈[n]\{i} and {yjk}j∈[n]\{i}. Hence, εik is
independent of (εk, {εlk}l∈[n]\{i,k}) as desired.
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